I work at the intersection of epistemology with the philosophy of mind, particularly on the interaction between internal and external perspectives on one’s own attitudes. For a sense of what I mean: If you believe that it will rain, then from your internal perspective it appears to be a fact about the world that it will rain. If on the other hand you merely know of another person’s belief that it will rain, then from your external perspective this appears merely to be a fact about a particular person’s state of mind, which might support that it will rain only against a background of further evidence concerning that person’s track record, reliability and so forth. These two perspectives can interact because just as you can learn evidence about another person’s beliefs—such as what she believes, and how she came to believe it—you can learn the same kind of evidence about yourself and your own beliefs. I think the interaction between these two perspectives plays a central role in a number of debates in epistemology, and my principal research project examines a few of these in particular: introspective self-knowledge, higher-order justification, the epistemology of memory and testimony, and skepticism in both a contemporary and a historical context.
For additional information on recent and upcoming research, please see my research statement.
Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater (handout): 2019, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6 (runner-up for the 2015 Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology).
Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief: 2016, Nous 50(1): 184-212.
Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?: 2015, Philosophical Review 124(3): 353-392.
What’s the Matter With Epistemic Circularity?: 2014, Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
Internalism, Stored Beliefs, and Forgotten Evidence (handout): forthcoming, Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology, Stephen Wright and Sandy Goldberg (eds.), OUP.