Research

cartesian theater new

I work mostly in epistemology and philosophy of mind, but with connections to decision theory, ethics, and the history of philosophy.  My papers deal with different topics but the overarching concerns are the first-person perspective and self-consciousness.

If you’re not here looking for a specific paper or topic, you might try ‘Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?’ or ‘Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater’, which are fairly general-interest.

Articles

‘Graded Ratifiability’:  forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy

‘Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore’s Paradox’ (handout, published version): 2021, Philosophical Review 130(2).

‘Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater’ (handout):  2019, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6 (runner-up, 2015 Sanders Prize in Epistemology).

‘Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief’:  2016, Nous 50(1): 184-212.

Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?’:  2015, Philosophical Review 124(3): 353-392.

What’s the Matter With Epistemic Circularity?’: 2014, Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.

Chapters

‘Internalism, Stored Beliefs, and Forgotten Evidence’ (handout): forthcoming, Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology, Stephen Wright and Sanford Goldberg (eds.), OUP.

Works in Progress

a paper on higher-order evidence

a paper on Moore’s paradox and the cogito (new draft coming soon)

a paper on the Cartesian Circle (new draft coming eventually)

Commentaries

Comments on James Doyle’s discussion of Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’ in his No Morality, No Self (handout)

Comments on Nathan Ballantyne’s ‘Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Skepticism’

Comments on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s ‘Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure’

Comments on Tom McClelland’s ‘Receptivity and Phenomenal Self-Knowledge’

Comments on Ted Everett’s ‘Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rationality’

Comments on Tom Kelly’s ‘Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment’

Comments on Jamie Dreier’s ‘Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement’